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SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
THE "PHYSICAL TRESPASS" DOCTRINE AND THE ADAPTION
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO MODERN TECHNOLOGY.
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes. Therefore a principle, to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is
peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments,
designed to meet passing occasions. . . . In the application of a
constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what
has been but of what may be... Its general principles would have
little value and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless
formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality.'
The relevancy of the above statement will become increasingly
evident in the months and years to come as the Supreme Court of the
United States faces the problems brought about by the application of the
fourth amendment2 to the developments in wire tapping and more
recently electronic eavesdropping. Technology, and particularly the de-
velopments in this area of electronics were undreamed of by the framers
of the Constitution and never posed a real threat to liberty until the turn
of the century. These developments bring to the front once again a serious
responsibility of the United States Supreme Court, that of balancing the
rights of society to be protected on one side, and the rights of the
individual to privacy on the other. With these rights in mind, the Court
must and will confront and answer the problems posed by these advances
of science. In doing this, the Court will again consider the "physical
trespass" doctrine first uttered in Olmstead v. United States.' The question
is: has this case, and more particularly its rationale, become outmoded by
the developments of modern technology?
The Olmstead case, decided in 1928, was the first case in which the
Supreme Court heard argument concerning wiretapping. Four federal
officers had intercepted the defendant's phone calls. Based upon evidence
secured from the intercepted calls, a conviction of conspiracy to violate
the National Prohibition Act was secured. The question for the Court
was whether the conviction violated the defendants rights under the
fourth and fifth amendments. By a 5-4 decision, over dissents by Justices
Holmes and Brandeis, the Court affirmed the conviction.
Chief Justice Taft wrote the majority opinion. The opinion first
confined the Court's consideration to the fourth amendment; a study of
the fifth amendment was not necessary because the conversations were
1Weems v. Hammond, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
2U. S. CONST. amend. IV. The right of the people to be secure in their
person, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
3277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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voluntary and a violation of the fifth depended upon the prior violation
of the fourth amendment. Emphasis was placed upon the fact that there
was no "physical trespass" and consequently, no illegal search under the
fourth amendment. Likewise, the overheard conversations could not be
the subject of an illegal seizure. The use of the phone constituted a
"projection of the voice" beyond the physical boundaries of the premises,
and therefore the fourth amendment was no longer applicable. In
essence, a physical entry into the victim's premises was necessary before
he could complain that his rights were violated.
Wiretapping was soon regulated to a great extent by Congress, with
the passage of the Federal Communications Act of 1934' and by the
Court in later decisions5 However, the "physical trespass" rationale of
the majority is still apparent in the later Court decisions dealing with
electronic eavesdropping.
In Goldman v. United States,6 federal agents had placed a highly
sensitive microphone called a detectaphone against the wall of an office.
They were able to hear conversations of Goldman in the office on the
other side of the wall. In affirming Goldman's conviction, the Court
compared the electronic ear of the detectaphone to an ordinary eaves-
dropper; and, there having been no physical entry or penetration within
the limits of Olmstead (which the minority would have overruled), the
act was held not to violate the fourth amendment.
The Court again took great pains to explicitly point out that the
eavesdropping had not been accomplished by means of an unauthorized
physical encroachment in On Lee v. United States! In this case an
informer and friend of On Lee had a microphone concealed on his person
when he went into defendant's laundry. The microphone transmitted the
conversation to a Government agent stationed outside the store. The agent
testified against On Lee at his trial. As to the fourth amendment, de-
fendant argued that there was a trespass as the hidden transmitter vitiated
the consent of entry, ab inito. The Court found this too technical a
theory and refused to apply it. No trespass was committed; the agent
went into the petitioner's place of business "with the consent, if not by
implied invitation of the petitioner."'
While reiterating the "physical trespass" test as an integral element
of fourth amendment violations, the rationale of past decisions became
further entrenched with a majority of the Court reaching a different
result in Silverman v. United States. In this case law officers inserted
a "spike mike" into a party wall between a house they were using and
that occupied by Silverman. The spike made contact with a heating duct
and picked up all conversations throughout the house. By a 9-0 vote the
448 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605.
SNardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Nardone v. United States
308 U.S. 338 (1930); Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, (1952); and Benanti
v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1956).
6316 U.S. 129 (1942).
7343 U.S. 747 (1952).
'Id. at 751-2.
9365 U.S. 505, (1961).
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,Court dearly indicated that it would not tolerate the kind of electronic
.surveillance employed in this case. The Court factually distinguished the
.Goldman detectaphone from the spike mike and found sufficient physical
penetration or invasion to render the acts of intrusion a violation of the
fourth amendment within the scope of the Olmstead decision.
In 1964, the Silverman decision was applied by the Court in Clinton
v. Virginia,"0 a per curiam opinion reversing a state court conviction in
which a mechanical listening device had been stuck in the wall. The
Court found "that the 'spiked' mike used by the police officers penetrated
petitioner's premises sufficiently to be an actual trespass .. ."" The
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia had attempted to distinguish this
case"2 from Silverman on the depth of penetration. After discussing the
fact that the Silverman spike mike was about a foot long and was "in-
serted" several inches, the Virginia Court reasoned that the mike in this
case had been "stuck in." "The penetration was very slight such as one
made by a thumb tack."13 They concluded that this was not "an unauthor-
ized penetration '14 and therefore there was no violation of the fourth
amendment.
Earlier, in Lopez v. United States,"5 despite the fact that the Court
based its decision upon the conclusion that no eavesdropping had occurred,
,the Court referred by dicta to some of the same reasoning concerning
electronic eavesdropping. The only limitation insisted upon was "that
the electronic device not be planted by an unlawful physical invasion
of a constitutionally protected area."1 The device in this case had not been
planted through the use of any "unlawful physical invasion of petitioner's
premises""7 and hence did not violate the fourth amendment.
By denying certiorari in Williams v. Ball," the Court refused to
apply the Mapp v. Ohio" decision to wiretapping. Previous decisions had
held that the fourth amendment applied only in federal actions. However,
in Mapp, the fourth was applied to state as well as federal action through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In denying certiorari
it is possible the Court was attempting to give Congress time to act by
passing legislation to regulate electronic eavesdropping. This year as in
the past, at least one congressional subcommittee is holding hearings and
investigating the problems created by electronic eavesdropping. The
present subcommittee"' is primarily concerned with alleged invasions of
privacy by federal agencies. Their first goal is to get as complete a
picture as possible of government surveillance techniques. Each individual
piece of government equipment may be innocent enough in appearance,
10377 U.S. 158 (1964).
11Id. at 158.
'2204 Va. 275, 130 S.E.2d 437, (1963).
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
s373 U.S. 427, (1963).
161d. at 438-9.
17 Id. at 438-9.
18368 U.S. 990 (1962).
19367 U.S. 643 (1961).20 Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Chairman,
Senator Edward V. Long (D.-Mo.), February 18, 1965.
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but the finished picture may be astounding. The committee is aware of
the broad discrepancies between the actual practice of wiretapping, the
present wording of the Federal Communication Act and federal and state
court decisions construing the act. It is foreseeable that wiretapping will
be further regulated when Congress acts by passing legislation to regulate
modem eavesdropping. Whether this comes to pass or not the Court is
still faced with the "physical trespass" doctrine.
It is difficult to see why the vital policy which underlies the
fourth amendment, or the balance between society's right of protection
and the individual's right of privacy, which the application of the amend-
ment demands, should be made to turn on such a fortuity as whether
the eavesdropping device is placed against the wall as in Goldman or
inserted into the wall as in Silverman and Clinton. By basing determina-
tions of constitutional invasions upon actual physical penetration, it
appears the Court is grafting a hard fast formula onto the Constitution
and more specifically, the fourth amendment. It would seem that instead,
the Court should be looking at the basic, underlying liberties which are
to be protected.
Justice Brandeis, in writing his dissent in Olmstead, warned that
the technological advances would continue. In applying Constitutional
provisions to these advances, he pointed out that the Court's contempla-
tion cannot be limited to what is and has been, but must also look to
what may be. Through new technology, the government would possess
means "more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure
in court of what is whispered in closets."2
This prophetic warning is now a reality. Wire tapping has been
perfected to such a high degree that, when skillfully done, it is difficult
to detect. "No direct connection with the wires is needed; a small in-
duction coil placed beside them repeats fluctuations of the current, which
an amplifier and earphones turn into intelligible sounds." Devices of
electronic eavesdropping have been perfected to such an extent that
today, with a parabolic microphone, one may listen to a conversation
being held in an office across the street.P It has been reported that a
sonic wave may have been developed which will make it possible to
overhear everything said from great distances.2 The ".... likely victims [of
the eavesdropper, whether they are] - lovers or diplomats, criminals or
key executives - can seldom be wholly sure any more that confidential
conversations are not being overheard or recorded."'
While these scientific advances were being made in wire tapping
and electronic eavesdropping, the law lagged behind. It seems quite clear
that adequate surveillance (lawful or unlawful) no longer requires an
actual trespass upon physical premises. The "physical trespass" test tends,
in effect, to treat all the liberties of an individual in an unequal manner.
Dissenting in Silverman, Justice Douglas pointed out that whether the
21277 U.S. 438, 473.22 Time, March 6, 1964, p. 55.
"Spra note 9, at 508.
24Id. at 508.
25 Time, March 6 1964, p. 55.
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